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1 Introduction
This paper examines the effect of ‘leakage of information,’ i.e., private information
becoming available to uninformed agents, on strategic market trading in a dynamic
context. In existing strategic models of trading under asymmetric information, the
set of informed traders, whether single or multiple, is held fixed over the different
rounds of trading, and the uninformed may try (or may not if they are ‘noise traders’)
to infer information from the trades and equilibrium outcomes. In these models the
informed can weigh the costs of the liquidity effect and the information effect and
can control how much information is revealed through prices. However, in many
situations of interest, the informed cannot be sure that information that they have
tried to keep private through uninformative trades may not become public at a later
date, or the uninformed can become informed through mechanisms other than inferring
information from equilibrium outcomes. Thus, the set of informed traders may grow
over a period of time. We show that this phenomenon may make the prices incorporate
the private information at a faster or slower rate depending on how the information
acquisition by the informed is modelled, i.e., is it costless or costly. In the latter case,
one may end up in a situation similar to the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox. In addition,
we also examine the incentives for the informed to sell their own private information
to the uninformed when there is a potential of information leakage.
The study of the effect of private information on trading has been an important
topic in economic theory and finance. The early literature on Rational Expectations
Equilibria examined the role of prices in the aggregation of information: to what
extent do the prices reveal the private information of the agents. The literature in
finance, especially that of market microstructure, examines the incentives of agents to
trade in the presence of asymmetric information when they recognize that their own
actions affect market prices. However, the literature largely takes the set of informed
agents to be fixed, and allows for no information leakage over the trading.
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In modelling the phenomenon of strategic trading and information leakage, we
use the strategic market game a la Shapley-Shubik (Shapley [20], Shapley and Shubik
[21]) as the underlying game. In this framework, the agents act strategically taking
into account how their actions affect equilibrium prices, and hence, account for their
own actions revealing information. This avoids the problem of the informed agents
acting ‘schizophrenically,’ (see Hellwig [10]) i.e., inferring information from prices while
not taking into account the effect of the informativeness of their own trade. In the
formulation of the model we follow Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [5]. Thus, we also
do not allow agents to condition their trades on the information contained in current
prices (see also Milgrom [19], and Hellwig [11]). If we are to think of trading taking
place in real time, then this sequence of trading is the appropriate one. Adopting this
formulation also avoids the problem associated with revealing Rational Expectations
Equilibria first pointed out by Beja [3].
There are several other formulations of strategic trading that have been ad-
vanced, such as the models of Glosten and Milgrom [8], Kyle [16], Easley and O’Hara
[6], Jackson [13], etc. We choose to work with the market game for three reasons.
The first is tractability. The nice linear structure of the Kyle [16] model is no longer
guaranteed once the market-maker has to update beliefs, taking into account that the
set of informed traders is evolving over time. In the paper, we restrict to presenting
examples, not because the general game is difficult to solve, but because the key insight
is cleanly seen in examples which have relatively simple solutions. These examples are
robust and can be generalized. The second is that we do not want to introduce noise
traders. In our framework, every one is fully rational, except that some are informed
and some are uninformed. Thus, if in our framework the price is non-revealing it is
not due to noise or some configuration of parameters, but because of equilibrium be-
haviour. In addition, the welfare effects on all agents (see Spiegel and Subrahmanyam
[22]) can be analyzed. Thirdly, this framework is flexible enough that a wide variety
of different configurations - costly and costless information, storage of commodities,
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the role of short-selling, bankruptcy, etc., can be handled in the same model.
The literature on strategic informed trading (e.g., the market microstructure lit-
erature starting from Kyle [16] (also see Madhavan [18] for a survey; Dubey, Geanako-
plos and Shubik [5], Jackson [13])) focusses on the case where the informed, who
could be one or more (for a static model see Kyle [17]), know they are the only
informed traders and trade taking into account the information revelation through
prices. There are two effects which they trade off - liquidity and informativeness. De-
pending on the formulation of the model, there can be fast revelation of prices (e.g.
Foster and Viswanathan [7], and Holden and Subrahmanyam [12]) or slow revelation
of prices (e.g. Kyle [16]). However, these models abstract away from one important
consideration - there is no change in the set of informed agents over time. This is not
satisfactory as in any market, the informed cannot be certain that they will continue
to be the only agents who are informed - if someone leaked the information to one,
how can he be sure that it will not be leaked to someone else in the future. This paper
focusses on how this affects the behaviour of the informed agents.
There are three problems we address in this paper. First, if the information is
costless, how does the potential leakage of information affect incentives to use infor-
mation at early stages of trading. In contrast to the intuition of Dubey, Geanakoplos
and Shubik [5] (in the market game framework) and Kyle [16] (in a model with a
market maker), the informed traders will want to use their information quickly. This
will be the case, whether they may have wished to wait to use information due to their
preferences, or whether they may have wished to wait to accumulate their stocks of
commodities and assets to trade at a later date. Secondly, if information is costly, how
does the potential leakage of information at a later date affect incentive to purchase
information in the first place? In contrast to Jackson [13] traders may not want to
purchase the information. Thus, one is back to the paradox of Grossman and Stiglitz
[9]. Thirdly, how does the potential of arrival of information affect the incentive of an
informed agent to sell the information? Here in contrast to Admati and Pfleiderer [1],
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informed agents will want to sell information not due to the motive in their paper,
but to a different motive.
As the evidence finds that ‘buys’ move prices more than ‘sells’ (see Chan and
Lakonishok [4] and Keim and Madhavan [15]) we focus on the case of informed buyers
and treat selling as non-information based. These papers also point out that when
agents trade on short lived information, they tend to prefer market orders. In fact, in
the market upto 90% of orders are market orders. In the market game formulation the
bids of the agents are best interpreted as such market orders. One can also interpret
the informed traders in our model as institutional traders who are long lived as opposed
to the uninformed traders who are private traders and in the market for only a short
time. The results also help explain price increases before the information is announced
in the market (see Barclay and Warner [2] for the case of tender-offers).
In the paper we outline the general formulation of the game. Then to make
the results stark we illustrate the phenomena through a series of examples. These
examples are variations of those in Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [5]. In looking
at the examples it will be clear that the results are robust and do not depend on the
special functional forms assumed.
2 The Model
We define a general market game following Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [5] with
one essential difference: the evolution of the information partitions. There is the
possibility that the information can leak to some uninformed traders so that at a
later date they become exogenously informed. This is a game without storage of
commodities.
There are a N = N I +NU,1 +NU,2 <∞ traders indexed by n, and two periods,
t = 1, 2. The NU,1 traders live in the first period and NU,2 live in the second. The
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reason for having two generations is that consumption takes place at the end of each
period, and we do not want information revelation from this act. Alternatively one can
have one generation but require all consumption to take place at the end of period 2.
The N I traders live for both the periods. There are a finite states of the world, s ∈ S,
which are realised before trading in the first period and this state remains the same
in the second period. For each agent n ∈ N let In be a partition of S representing
the initial information of n. If the state of nature is s then each trader knows the set
In(s) in his information partition that contains s. The traders n ∈ N I are informed,
i.e., In(s) = {s} for n ∈ N I . There are a finite number of commodities L in each state
and period. The N I traders have a utility function over their consumption set. The
utility function, un is twice-continuously differentiable, concave, and monotonic. The
NU,t, t = 1, 2 uninformed traders in each period each have utility functions with the
same properties as above. Each trader has an endowment en,t in the periods in which
he is alive, and the endowment is measurable with respect to their information set.
The game can be thought of as an extensive form game. Nature moves by
selecting a state s. In the first period, at each node, n ∈ N I ∪NU,1 of the players move
simultaneously given their information partitions. A move for each player at each node
is a 2(L− 1) dimensional vector of bids and offers zn,t = (bn,t1 , . . . , bn,tL−1, qn,t1 , . . . , qn,tL−1).
The subscript denotes the commodity, the first argument of the superscript is the
identity of the player, and the second argument is the period in which the trade
is made, t = 1, 2. Each bn,tl represents a quantity of the Lth good that is bid on
commodity l, and qn,tl represents a quantity of the lth good that is offered for sale.
Given a vector of moves for each trader, the market adds the bids and offers for each
commodity, btl(z) =
∑
n b
n,t
l , i = 1, . . . , L− 1, and qtl (z) =
∑
n q
n,t
l , i = 1, . . . , L− 1. It
sets ptl(z) =
btl(z)
qtl (z)
. If there are no offers, the price is zero. The consumers receive net
trades
yn,tl =
bn,tl
ptl
− qnl .
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In addition,
yn,tL =
L−1∑
l=1
qn,tl p
t
l −
L−1∑
i=1
bn,ti .
If there is no inventorying then players at node s ∈ S consume the net trade plus the
endowment at that node, i.e., xn,tl = e
n,t
l + y
n,t
l .
Each node s ∈ S in period 1 leads to an infinity of successor nodes (s, z,m)
where z is the collective play of the agents at node s, and m indexes the number of
generation 2 uninformed who have become informed. Thus, in node (s, z,m) there
will be a new generation of players, of which m will be informed and NU,2−m will be
uninformed. In what follows we restrict NU,1 = NU,2 and that that each generation
trader is identical to the corresponding trader in the previous generation except that
their information sets may be different. Denote the information set of these players
by In,2. These players refine the information observing prices, which may or may not
convey any information, and there is a probability that they can become informed.
Thus, let ρ be a probability that one of these NU,2 players is leaked the information.
Thus, the information set of player n ∈ NU,2 is with probability ρ is the same as that
of the informed players, i.e., In,2 = s ∨ p1 and with the complementary probability
1 − ρ, In,2 = In ∨ p1, where p1 is the price realized in the first period of trading. As
each of the NU,2 ‘uninformed’ traders can become exogenously informed before the
second round of trading, the probability that M of them are informed is given by(
NU,2
M
)
ρM(1 − ρ)NU,2−M . The rules of the second round are identical to those of the
first round.
A strategy of a player n is to pick a move at each node in each period when
he is active such that it is measurable with respect to his information set in that
period. We also have the restrictions that qn,tl (s) ≤ en,tl (s), for l = 1, . . . , L − 1, and∑L−1
j=1 b
n,t
j (s) ≤ en,tL (s), t = 1, 2. In other words, a trader cannot short-sell a commodity
in any period, and the total bids for commodities must be less than or equal to the
endowment of the commodity money. We analyse the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of
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this game. As we are going to restrict oursevlves to situations where traders can be
on only one side of the market, only buy or sell a commodity, there will be no loss in
generality in looking at only the pure-strategy equilibria of the game.
3 Example 1: Costless information
We look at a simplified version of the game above. There are two time periods t = 1, 2.
There is only one perishable good in each period in addition to the commodity money.
There is no inventorying. There are two equiprobable states. In state 2 the good has
no value. There are three types of traders: sellers (who can be either informed or
uninformed) and informed and uninformed buyers. There is one trader of each type.1
Sellers have utility only for money, and have 20 units of the good in each period. Thus,
it does not matter if the sellers are thought to be informed or uninformed as they will
always want to sell their entire endowment. Informed buyers (I) are long-lived and
have the utility function:
uI =
[
1
2
(A log xI,11 + w
I,1
1 ) +
1
2
wI,12
]
+
[
1
2
(B log xI,21 + w
I,2
1 ) +
1
2
wI,22
]
.
where xI,ts is the consumption of the good in state s in period t, and w
I,t
s is the
consumption of ‘money’ in state s and period t. In addition we restrict A,B > 0.
The uninformed buyers (U) live for only one period. The uninformed buyers in
the first period have utility functions:
uU,1 =
[
1
2
(A log xU,11 + w
U,1
1 ) +
1
2
wU,12
]
.
The uninformed buyers in the second period have utility functions:
uU,2 =
[
1
2
(B log xU,21 + w
U,2
1 ) +
1
2
wU,22
]
.
1This can be generalized to an equal finite, number of traders of each type.
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The buyers have zero holdings of the good, and M units of ‘money’ in each period.
The informed know the true state while the uninformed do not know the true
state. Thus, their information partition consists of the two states. While, the unin-
formed in the first period cannot use the information which may be revealed by the
prices, the uninformed in the second period can use information contained in past
prices.
3.1 Case 1: No leakage of information
To analyze the game we proceed as follows. First, we examine the optimal behavior of
the two buyers in the second period, depending on whether both are informed (whether
the ‘uninformed’ acquired the information through information leakage, or from past
prices) or one is informed and the other uninformed. Note that in the second period
the informed will always choose to use the private information if it has remained as
such. Then, we look at the behavior of the two traders in the first period in isolation.
The informed while trading (against the uninformed) has to weigh the payoff derived
from first period trades against the informational impact of the trades. Thus, in
the third step, the informed in the first period computes overall payoff of adopting
a particular strategy taking into account the informational impact of trading in the
first period, taking as given the optimal plays in the second period. The Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium will be that strategy which gives the highest equilibrium payoff
to the Informed taking into account the informational impact of their trades. As the
‘Uninformed’ operate in only one period, they ignore any intertemporal informational
effects. The second generation of the ‘Uninformed’ do perform Bayesian updating, but
if the Informed has chosen to adopt a non-revealing strategy, the priors will not be
refined. The method of solving the game has taken sequential rationality into account.
Given information partition, in the second period, each buyer selects how much
to bid for the commodity. For the Informed bI,2s ∈ [0,M ], where the subscript s denotes
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the state s = 1, 2. As there is no gain from with-holding information in the last period,
let bI,21 = b
I,2 and bI,22 = 0. If the other player is Uninformed, then he is constrained to
choosing a bid that is independent of the state, bU,21 = b
U,2
2 = b
U ∈ [0,M ]. The market
aggregates bids and offers. Thus, b2s =
∑
i
bi,2s , and q
2
s =
∑
i
qi,2s . Given these, the price
is determined:
p2s =
b2s
q2s
.
The buyers receive net trades of the commodity:
yi,ns =
bi,2s
p2s
.
The consumption is the net trade of the commodity, and the endowment of money
minus the bid, wi,ns = M − bi,ns .
First, consider the case that the Uninformed have remained as such. The sec-
ond period pay off to informed trader is:
piI,2 =
1
2
(
B log
bI,2
p21
+M − bI,2
)
+
1
2
M =
1
2
(
B log
bI,2
p21
− bI,2
)
+M .
For the Uninformed, the bidding is independent of state:
piU,2 =
1
2
(
B log
b2
p21
+M − b2
)
+
1
2
(
M − b2
)
=
1
2
B log
b2
p21
− b2 +M .
Where p21 =
bI,2 + b2
20
and p22 =
b2
20
.
The equilibrium bids can be derived for the two agents can be obtained from
the first order conditions as:
1. For I: Bb2 = bI,2(b2 + bI,2).
2. For U : BbI,2 = 2b2(b2 + bI,2).
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Note there is always a trivial autarkic solution where there is no trade. We
concentrate on the equilibrium where there is non-trivial trade. Suppose, B = 20,
then solve for bI,2∗ = 8.28 and b2∗ = 5.84. Given this the allocations of the commodity
are xI,2∗1 = 11.728, x
U,2∗
1 = 8.272. The Payoffs in period 2 are: pi
I,2∗ = 20.368, and
piU,2∗ = 15.286.
Now consider the case where both agents are Informed. In this case the payoff
function to both is:
piI,2 =
1
2
(
B log
bI,2
p21
− bI,2
)
+M.
The equilibrium bids can be computed as bI,2∗ = 10, and the payoff to both is:
1
2
(
20 log
10
20
20− 10
)
+M.
For both traders this is equal to 18.026.
Now consider period 1 in isolation, ignoring the effect of trades on the revelation
of information through prices. In a similar way as above one can calculate the payoffs
within the period.
First, consider the case where the Informed chooses to act as such. Then we
are in a similar situation to the first case above. The payoff functions for the two
traders will look similar except that the coefficient will be A rather than B. If we set
A = 10, then:
1. bI,1∗1 = 4.142, b
I,1∗
2 = 0, and pi
I,1∗ = 10.234.
2. bU,1∗1 = b
U,1∗
2 = 2.928, and pi
U,1∗ = 7.643.
If the Informed chose to act as uninformed in the first period, i.e., choose a
strategy of bidding an equal positive amount in each state, then the payoff in the first
period for the two traders will be:
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piU,1 =
1
2
A log
b1
p11
− b1 +M.
In equiliubrium, bU,1∗1 = b
U,1∗
2 = 2.5, and pi
U,1∗ = 1
2
10 log 2.5
5
20−2.5+M = 9.013.
Thus, payoff matrix in period 1 is:
Informed Uninformed
Informed 10.234,7.643
Uninformed 7.643, 10.234 9.013, 9.013
The payoff matrix in period 2 is:
Informed Uninformed
Informed 18.026, 18.026 20.468, 15.286
Uninformed 15.286, 20.468
In deciding the optimal strategy, the Informed has to take into account the
informational impact of trading in the first period. If he chose to act as an informed
trader in the first period, then while he would have a higher payoff in the first period,
the information will be incorporated in the first period, and all will be informed in
the second period. Alternatively, if the Informed chooses not to use the information
in the first period, the first period payoff will be lower, but in the second period he
will be the only informed trader.
Thus, Informed can compute their payoff with disclosure (trading like Informed
in the first period), and payoff without disclosure (trading like an Uninformed trader
in the first period).
1. Payoff with disclosure = 10.234 + 18.026 = 28.26
2. Payoff without disclosure = 9.013 + 20.468 = 29.481
Thus, the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium has the Informed choosing not
to disclose information in first period.
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3.2 Case II: Leakage of information
Now suppose that with probability ρ the Uninformed can costlessly acquire information
in period 2. The game otherwise is the same as before. To compute the equilibrium,
all one has to do is take into account that if the Informed did not disclose information
through trades, with probability ρ in the next period the Uninformed will be informed
as well, and with probability 1−ρ will remain uninformed. Thus, the Informed has to
compute the payoff of non-disclosure and disclosure and choose the optimal strategy
accordingly.
Utility of non-disclosure > Utility of disclosure
9.013 + (1− ρ)20.468 + ρ18.026 > 10.234 + 18.026
1.221
2.442
> ρ
0.5 > ρ.
Thus, if ρ is sufficiently high then in the unique Perfect Bayesian equilibrium the
Informed will not find it worthwhile to hide the information. The intuition is simple.
While there is a gain to waiting (given by the coefficients of the utility function) it is
negated by the fact that with probability ρ there may be no informational privelege in
the second period, and thus, the Informed buyer has an incentive to use the information
at an early date.
3.3 Note
1. One can generalize this example to see that there will be a monotonic relation
between the gain from waiting,
B
A
, and the probability of information leakage, ρ,
for trade to take place at an earlier date, i.e., the higher is the gain from waiting
the higher has to be ρ to lead to early trade.
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2. This example is somewhat artificial in that we have forced a form of anti-
discounting or a benefit from waiting B > A. If we have B < A, then the
information will always be used in the first period. If we are to interpret the
game as one where the traders consume at the end of the two rounds then the
assumption of B > A is consistent with costs of inventorying the consumption
good.
3. In the fourth example we look at the case of costless inventorying where there
is an endogenous gain from waiting.
4 Example 2: Costly Information
In this example we maintain the structure and details of the game in Example 1, except
that the information acquisition is changed. The ‘Informed’ agent has the option to
purchase the information before the first period of trading at a cost ∆. Only they
have the option to purchase the information. If the buyer chooses not to purchase
the information before the first round of trading, the option lapses, and he does not
have access to it before the second round. Thus, the acquisition of information is
endogenous.
4.1 Case I: No information leakage
The ‘Informed’ buyer will find it worthwhile to purchase information if the cost of
purchasing it is less than the gain from using it. The way the game has been structured,
if the information is purchased, it will never be used in the first round of trading as
A < B. The amount that he would be willing to pay is: Payoff when informed −
Payoff when not being informed. In the previous example, we have computed the
first payoff to be 29.481, and the second payoff to be 9.013 + 18.026 = 27.039. Thus
if ∆ < 29.481 − 27.039 = 2.442, the buyers who have the option of purchasing the
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information will exercise it. In this scenario, they will also have the incentive not to
use the information in the first round of trading.
4.2 Case II: Leakage of information
Now suppose that with probability ρ the Uninformed (only) can acquire before the
second round of trading. One can either interpret it as the information is leaked to
them costlessly with probability ρ, or that with probability ρ the information is sold
to them at a low cost such that they find it worthwhile to acquire the information if
it is made available to them. From the viewpoint of the ‘Informed’ what is important
is that in the second period with probability ρ they face an informed rather than an
uninformed buyer. The buyer who has foregone the option to purchase the information
in the first period has no access to it.
We know from the previous example, that if ρ < 0.5, and if information was
costless, the Informed would not have disclosed information in period 1. Now, set
ρ = 0.05, and ∆ = 2.4. We know that in the absence of information leakage, the
‘Informed’ would be willing to purchase the information at this cost. However, will
they still purchase the information when there is information leakage?
The utility from purchasing information and not disclosing it in the first round
of trading is: 9.013 + 0.95(20.468) + 0.05(18.026) - 2.4 = 26.9589. The utility from
purchasing and disclosing information in the first round of trading is: 10.234 + 18.026
- 2.4 = 25.470. If the buyer does not purchase the information in the first period
then with a probability ρ he is the uninformed and the other buyer is informed, while
with probability 1 − ρ both remain uninformed. The utility from not purchasing
information: 9.013 + 0.95(18.026) + 0.05 (15.286) = 27.024.
Thus, even if there is a disadvantage to being the uninformed in the second
period, its cost is outweighed by the cost of purchasing the information in the first
place - as with probability ρ the information is worthless in the second period. The
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unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium has no purchase of information in the first period.
The scenario is somewhat similar to the example of Grossman and Stiglitz [9] where
no one purchases the information when there is a potential gain to purchasing it. With
a very high probability (in this example 0.95) the markets will not be informationally
efficient as no one will acquire the information.
4.3 Note
1. One can generalize the example to obtain a monotonic relationship between ρ
and ∆.
5 Example 3: Sale of information
So far the sale of information has not beem modelled. One would want to know that
if the person with access to information had a choice to sell the information whether
he would be willing to sell it, and how the incentive to sell the information is affected
by the potential leakage of the information. Admati and Pfliederer [1] show that an
‘Informed’ agent may wish to sell information if he is risk-averse (to permit better
risk-sharing amongst the informed).
Here we focus on the long-lived agent who is Informed and has to decide whether
to sell the information. The structure of the game and parameters are the same as in
Example 1.
5.1 Case I: No leakage of information
If the Informed sells information at cost δ in period 1, the Uninformed agent will
immediately use the information, and the information will become public in period
2. Recognizing this, the informed will also want to use the information in the first
stage. Thus, there will be two Informed traders in the first period. In this case the
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first period-payoff function to each is:
piI,1 =
1
2
(
A log
bI,1
p11
− bI,1
)
+M.
The equilibrium bids can be computed as bI,1∗ = 5, and the payoff to both is:
1
2
(
10 log
5
10
10− 5
)
+M.
For both traders this is equal to 9.013.
What is maximal amount that can be charged for the information in period 1
by the Informed ? We have 0 ≤ δ ≤ 9.013 − 7.643 = 1.37. The total payoff to the
informed buyer is: 9.013 + δ + 18.026 = 27.039 + δ.
If he does not sell the information, and there is no arrival of information, then
payoff is: 9.013 + 20.468 = 29.481. Thus, as the gain to waiting (29.481 - 27.039
= 2.442) is greater than the maximal amount that can be charged, he will not sell
information. Will he want to sell the information in period 2? The maximal amount
that can be charged is now 18.026 - 15.286 = 2.740. The gain in payoff of being the
only informed in the second period is 29.481 - (9.013 + 18.026) = 2.442. Thus, the
informed will want to sell the information in period 2 for a price 2.442 <γ < 2.740.
Even though the Informed does not benefit from the information while trading, the
proceeds from its sale compensate the loss in informational advantage. As the traders
are risk averse in this example the sale or non-sale of information is not being driven
by risk-sharing considerations.
5.2 Case II: Leakage of information
We know that for these parameters, that if there is arrival of information with proba-
bility ρ < 0.5, the Informed will not reveal information in period 1 through his trades.
In this case, the payoff is: 9.013 + (1-ρ)20.468 + ρ 18.026. Fix ρ = 0.45, and then
this payoff = 28.381. However, now the informed will prefer to sell the information in
period 1 at cost δ ∈ (1.342, 1.37).
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What about selling the information in period 2, instead of period 1?
The most that Uninformed in period 2 would be willing to pay is γ ≥ 0 such
that:
18.026− γ ≥ ρ18.026− (1− ρ)15.286.
When ρ = 0.45, then 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.433. The total payoff from not selling information
in period 2 is 28.381 and the total payoff from selling information in period 2: 27.039
+ γ. Again the informed will rather sell information at cost 1.352 ≤ γ ≤ 1.433. The
Informed will rather sell information in period 2 than 1 as in this case the possible
surplus that can be extracted is higher.
Notice that in the case of information leakage, the value of the information
declines. This is what causes the Informed to now find it worthwhile to sell the
information in the first period, and also what causes the decrease in the price that
can be charged for the information in the second period. This avenue is different from
that in Admati and Pfleiderer [1], as it is not risk-aversion which is driving the result
but the decrease in the value of the priveleged information.
6 Inventories and arrival of information
In the previous examples the gain to waiting was somewhat artificial. The coefficients
of the utility functions exhibited ‘anti-discounting.’ We now consider a different sce-
nario where the potential of storing (inventorying) the commodities leads to a natural
gain to waiting. The structure of the game is different from that in the previous
examples.
There are two time periods t = 1, 2. There is only one consumption good
in each period in addition to the commodity money. Both the goods can be stored
costlessly. However, the traders cannot borrow against the future. There are four
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equiprobable states, indexed by the subscript s = 1, 2, 3, 4. There are two types of
agents, α (the buyers) and β (the sellers).
The preferences are given by:
uα =
1
4
(xα,11 + x
α,2
1 )
0.5 +
1
4
((wα,12 + w
α,2
2 )
1
2
)0.5 +
1
4
(wα,13 + w
α,2
3 )
0.5 +
1
4
(xα,14 + x
α,2
4 )
0.5,
and:
uβ =
1
4
(xβ,11 + x
β,2
1 )
0.5 +
1
4
((wβ,12 + w
β,2
2 )
3
2
)0.5 +
1
4
((wβ,13 + w
β,2
3 )
4
3
)0.5 +
1
4
(xβ,14 + x
β,2
4 )
0.5.
Thus, in state 1,4 only the good has utility, while in state 2,3 only the money
has utility. Traders of type α can distinguish between odd and even states, and traders
of type β can distinguish between s ∈ {1, 2} and s ∈ {3, 4}. The endowment of α is
20 units of money in each period for s = 1, 3 and 30 units of money in s = 2, 4. The
endowment of β is 20 units of the good in each period for s = 1, 2 and 15 units of the
good in s = 3, 4.
Each of the traders participates on the markets on both the dates. Otherwise,
the rules of the market game is exactly as that above.
6.1 Case I: No arrival of information
If the agents know the state of nature, there will be no exchange, as there are no gains
from trade. This information can only be revealed through the trades. There are two
possible scenarios.
1. Scenario 1: The agents trade in the first period, and there is no trade in the
second.
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2. Scenario 2: The agents carry over their endowments to the second period, and
trade in the second.
6.1.1 Scenario 1
In the first period the α agent maximizes:
Maxb1O, b1E
1
4
(
b1O
p11
)0.5
+
1
4
((
30− b1E
) 1
2
)0.5
+
1
4
(
20− b1O
)0.5
+
1
4
(
b1E
p14
)0.5
.
The β agent maximizes:
Maxs1L, s1R
1
4
(
20− s1L
)0.5
+
1
4
(
p12s
1
L
3
2
)0.5
+
1
4
(
p13s
1
R
4
3
)0.5
+
1
4
(
15− s1R
)0.5
.
One can derive the first order conditions and solve for the equilibrium. The
equilibrium is given by (for the first period): b10 = 10, b
1
E = 15, s
1
L = 7.5, s
1
R = 6.667,
p11 = 1, p
1
2 = 2, p
1
3 = 1.5, p
1
4 = 2.
The total payoff for the two periods for α = 4.031 and the payoff for β = 4.732.
Note that in period 2 there is no trade and the agents keep their endowments.
6.1.2 Scenario 2
In the first period there is no trade and all the goods are stored till the second period.
In period 2 the α agent maximizes:
Maxb2O, b2E
1
4
(
b2O
p21
)0.5
+
1
4
((
60− b2E
) 1
2
)0.5
+
1
4
(
40− b2O
)0.5
+
1
4
(
b2E
p24
)0.5
.
The β agent maximize:
Maxs2L, s2R
1
4
(
40− s2L
)0.5
+
1
4
(
p22s
2
L
3
2
)0.5
+
1
4
(
p23s
2
R
4
3
)0.5
+
1
4
(
30− s2R
)0.5
.
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The equilibrium is now given by (for the second period): b20 = 20, b
2
E = 30,
s2L = 15, s
2
R = 13.33, p
2
1 = 1, p
2
2 = 2, p
2
3 = 1.5, p
2
4 = 2. The payoff for α = 4.176 and
the payoff for β = 5.239.
Thus, the unique equilibrium has trade only in the second period.
6.2 Case 2: Leakage of information
Now suppose that with an exogenous probability ρ both the agents can acquire in-
formation (costlessly) before trading in period 2 of the true state of nature, i.e., it
becomes public knowledge what the state is. Now the traders will have to reconsider
the payoff from waiting. With probability (1 − ρ) the payoff is the same as above.
However, with probability ρ there is no-trade (as both are informed) in period 2. The
payoffs for both, in this case, are equal to: 2.95. Thus, if (1−ρ)4.176 +ρ2.95 < 4.031,
or ρ > 0.118, the agent 1 will trade in period 1. For this example, agent 2 would
rather have waited till period 2 for ρ ≤ 0.393.
7 Conclusion
The efficient market hypothesis can be broken up into two parts (Jackson and Peck
[14]:
1. Prices reflect all available information.
2. Uninformed do not lose due to informational disadvantage.
We see from the examples above that in the case of costless information:
1. If there is no information leakage the Informed may not disclose information in
period, so that (1) and (2) fail.
20
2. However, if there is a potential for Uninformed to acquire information at a later
date, then prices are likely to be revealing so (1) is true, but not (2).
Thus, the potential for information leakage forces early disclosure of informa-
tion.
In the case of costly information:
1. If there is no information leakage, then agents will want to purchase costly
information, so that (1) and (2) fail.
2. However, if information can become available at a later date with a very low
probability, then no one will want to pay to acquire the information, so that (1)
can fail, but (2) may not.
Thus, there is a difference of the informativeness of prices depending on whether
information is costly or not. In practice, acquisition of priveleged information is costly.
However, often people choose not to acquire this information. In part, it is due to the
intuition of the examples, there is a chance that the information may become useless
before it can be used, thus, decreasing the attractiveness of acquiring the information.
The fact that prices are not informationally efficient is not due to the revelation
through prices as agents take into account that their trades will reveal their private
information, but due to the channel pointed out above. This is also what drives the
incentive to sell information rather than keep it exclusive and use it in trading.
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